1. Repositório Institucional da UFMG
  2. Publicações Científicas e Culturais
  3. Artigo de Periódico
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1843/50505
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.creatorLélis Pedro de Andradept_BR
dc.creatorAureliano Angel Bressanpt_BR
dc.creatorRobert Aldo Iquiapazapt_BR
dc.date.accessioned2023-02-28T13:48:35Z-
dc.date.available2023-02-28T13:48:35Z-
dc.date.issued2017-
dc.citation.volume21pt_BR
dc.citation.issue4pt_BR
dc.citation.spage1053pt_BR
dc.citation.epage1092pt_BR
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10997-017-9375-7pt_BR
dc.identifier.issn13853457pt_BR
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1843/50505-
dc.description.resumoThis study aims to identify whether a relationship exists between the controlling shareholders’ voting power and outside directors’ effectiveness in maximizing firms’ financial performance. We analyze a panel data with 3057 observations for the 2000–2012 period using a random effects model, logit and probit regressions, and the two-stage model of Heckman in the Brazilian stock market. Our findings show that firms whose controlling shareholders use dual class shares to leverage their voting power have less independence from the board and worse financial performance and market value. Further, the percentage of outside directors tends to be ineffective in increasing the firm’s value, and in changing the firm’s chief executive officer (CEO) when (1) the controlling shareholder’s voting power is leveraged, or (2) when the CEO assumes a position on the board of directors simultaneously. We interpreted that these results are in line with the arguments in favor of the existence of a new agency cost, which is related to the undue obedience of board members to authority, such as the largest controlling shareholder or the CEO in Brazilian listed firms.pt_BR
dc.languageengpt_BR
dc.publisherUniversidade Federal de Minas Geraispt_BR
dc.publisher.countryBrasilpt_BR
dc.publisher.departmentFCE - DEPARTAMENTO DE CIÊNCIAS ADMINISTRATIVASpt_BR
dc.publisher.initialsUFMGpt_BR
dc.rightsAcesso Abertopt_BR
dc.subjectVoting powerpt_BR
dc.subjectDual class sharespt_BR
dc.subjectOutside directorspt_BR
dc.subjectAgency costspt_BR
dc.subject.otherAdministração de empresaspt_BR
dc.titleDual class shares, board of directors’ effectiveness and firm’s market value: an empirical studypt_BR
dc.title.alternativeDual class shares board of directors effectiveness and firm s market value: an empirical studypt_BR
dc.typeArtigo de Periódicopt_BR
Appears in Collections:Artigo de Periódico

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
Dual class shares, board of directors’ effectiveness and firm’s market value an empirical study - s10997-017-9375-7-2.pdf619.71 kBAdobe PDFView/Open
Show simple item record


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.