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http://hdl.handle.net/1843/51045| Tipo: | Artigo de Periódico |
| Título: | Incomplete understanding of concepts and knowing in part what something is |
| Autor(es): | André Joffily Abath |
| Resumen: | Burge (1979) famously argued that one can have thoughts involving a concept C even if one’s understanding of C is incomplete. Even though this view has been extremely influential, it has also been taken by critics as being less than clear. The aim of this paper is to show that the cases imagined by Burge (1979) as being ones in which incomplete understanding of concepts is involved can be made clearer given an account of direct concept ascriptions — such as “Peter has the concept of arthritis” — according to which these ascrip-tions are to be analysed in terms of ascriptions of the knowledge of what something is. The upshot is that the cases imagined by Burge (1979) can be explained is terms of the idea of subjects knowing in part what something is. |
| Asunto: | Burge, Tyler Conceitos |
| Idioma: | por |
| País: | Brasil |
| Editor: | Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais |
| Sigla da Institución: | UFMG |
| Departamento: | FAF - DEPARTAMENTO DE FILOSOFIA |
| Tipo de acceso: | Acesso Aberto |
| Identificador DOI: | https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n2p419 |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/1843/51045 |
| Fecha del documento: | 2020 |
| metadata.dc.url.externa: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/70665 |
| metadata.dc.relation.ispartof: | Principia: an international journal of epistemology |
| Aparece en las colecciones: | Artigo de Periódico |
archivos asociados a este elemento:
| archivo | Descripción | Tamaño | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| andreIncompleteUderstanding.pdf | 2.46 MB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
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