Incomplete understanding of concepts and knowing in part what something is

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Tipo:	Artigo de Periódico
Título:	Incomplete understanding of concepts and knowing in part what something is
Autor(es):	André Joffily Abath
Resumo:	Burge (1979) famously argued that one can have thoughts involving a concept C even if one’s understanding of C is incomplete. Even though this view has been extremely influential, it has also been taken by critics as being less than clear. The aim of this paper is to show that the cases imagined by Burge (1979) as being ones in which incomplete understanding of concepts is involved can be made clearer given an account of direct concept ascriptions — such as “Peter has the concept of arthritis” — according to which these ascrip-tions are to be analysed in terms of ascriptions of the knowledge of what something is. The upshot is that the cases imagined by Burge (1979) can be explained is terms of the idea of subjects knowing in part what something is.
Assunto:	Burge, Tyler Conceitos
Idioma:	por
País:	Brasil
Editor:	Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
Sigla da Instituição:	UFMG
Departamento:	FAF - DEPARTAMENTO DE FILOSOFIA
Tipo de Acesso:	Acesso Aberto
Identificador DOI:	https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n2p419
URI:	http://hdl.handle.net/1843/51045
Data do documento:	2020
metadata.dc.url.externa:	https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/70665
metadata.dc.relation.ispartof:	Principia: an international journal of epistemology
Aparece nas coleções:	Artigo de Periódico

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