Entre o saber e o segredo: uma leitura realista da tolerância da espionagem internacional na era do medo

Abstract

This paper analyzes state sponsored espionage activities through International Law and International Relations. Initially, a brief introductory and descriptive study of the intelligence service is presented, where its duties, structure and functioning are examined, as well as the corresponding control and oversight mechanisms. Subsequently, the current political context in which some of the greatest world's intelligence services operate is discussed. In this opportunity, we argue that the security rhetoric in the face of terrorist threats of Islamic extremism was the main factor that propelled the capacities of those services. Afterwards, the current capabilities of the intelligence services are explored and the main problems associated with a broad strategy of information gathering are identified. Then, we assume a dogmatic position to provide answers to the problem of peacetime espionage international lawfulness. In this analysis the problem is stratified so that we can critically examine the lawfulness of different types of espionage under International Law, suggesting the following and novel classification: a) espionage of private information from individuals; b) economic espionage of trade secrets; and c) espionage of State secrets. To this classification corresponds an analysis of the lawfulness of the activity under the International Law regimes in which they are inserted, respectively, the international protection of human rights, intellectual property law, and the protection of national sovereignty. Thus, we intended to verify if the international espionage violates each of these forms of protection when it aims the different types of information mentioned. The findings achieved are summarized in the conclusion that the scarcity of rules of International Law applicable to the espionage problem defines a context of tolerance, which is manifested in different degrees, according to the type of the activity. We resort to the study of International Relations to investigate the causes of tolerance of international espionage, what is performed under the propositions of political realism. This is preceded by a proposal of revisiting the realism in light of a revaluation of its opposed criticism. We investigate, also under the realistic perspective, the political significance and the consequences that a context of tolerance of espionage produces in international relations. Here we found that the tolerance supports the preservation of the status quo of great powers, but, at the same time, mitigates the security dilemma by interfering with the level of uncertainty among States. Finally, we suggest that States with modest intelligence capacities should ally in information sharing networks as the better strategy for overcome the status quo.