A liberdade de imprensa e a teoria da integridade no direito: uma leitura a partir do pensamento de Ronald Dworkin

Abstract

This dissertation intends to investigate the way the Federal Supreme Court has been ruling in cases that have as object the application of the principle of freedom of the press. A cursory reading of his judgments could lead the reader to interpret that the highest court in Brasil would adopt Alexy's theory of principle weighting to solve cases where those principles collide. It is intended, however, to demonstrate that this theory would not be properly applied and that if it were, this would not be the best choice of hermeneutic method for the task. The purpose is to re-read the judgments of the Supreme Court based on Ronald Dworkin's theory of integrity, which starts from the notion of adequacy of principles to arrive at a correct answer for each specific case. Thus, it is intended to shed a new light on such an important issue for the paradigm we live in, given the close relationship between the principle of freedom of the press and democracy itself.