Mitigando os conflitos tributários: da lógica punitiva à cooperação

Abstract

For some time now, Brazil has held the title of world champion in tax litigation, which deters investments, increases production costs, delays revenue collection, and creates an environment of distrust and uncertainty to the detriment of society as a whole. Reducing tax conflicts has become a common goal for the three branches of government, which must, each in their own area of expertise, make efforts to resolve or prevent administrative and judicial disputes. However, the reduction of tax litigation will only be achieved when its most relevant cause is addressed, namely, the confrontational nature of the relationship between the tax authorities and taxpayers in Brazil. This research aims to demonstrate that a paradigm shift in the tax relationship, moving from the traditional command-and-control strategy to one of trust and cooperation, can address the main causes of tax conflicts in Brazil, preventing their emergence or facilitating and speeding up their resolution. Recommended by international organizations and adopted in major Western democracies around the world, cooperative compliance programs have great potential to reduce conflicts by advocating for a joint, transparent, and preventive action between tax authorities and taxpayers, based on mutual collaboration and trust. For successful implementation, such programs require a change in mindset, which can only be achieved through different models of supervision, focused on encouraging and assisting compliance, rather than surprise and punishment.