Relação entre governança corporativa e o desempenho de empresas de capital aberto: estudo comparativo Brasil e França

Abstract

Good corporate governance practices are currently adopted by companies that wish to be seen as safe and liquid investments, and thus attract investor resources, which in turn require considerable returns on applied capital. Based primarily on the theory of the firm proposed by Coase (1937), in the Agency Theory proposed by Berle and Means (1932) and in the Agency Costs of Jensen and Meckling (1976), this work, through analysis of the performance of publicly traded companies listed on the São Paulo and Paris Stock Exchanges, based on data from 2005, the period of this study, studied the relationship between corporate governance practices and companies' financial performance, using 2005 data for a sample comprising 592 French companies and 222 Brazilian companies. Using the least squares (OLS) method, using variables ROA, ROE, ROCE and ROIC as proxies for the measurement of company performance, seven variables were analyzed. The results of these variables corroborate those obtained by other researchers, such as Bruni (1998), Rogers (2006) and Alencar and Lopes (2005). In this study, the French sample obtained, in a general way, a more adjusted square R for all verified variables than the Brazilian sample.