A liberdade como aporia e fundamento dos direitos humanos: um ver fenomenológico

Abstract

This study is a reflection on the essence of human rights and draws on the history of philosophy and metaphysics in order to think about freedom as the foundation of these rights, from their origins in modern times to the present day. As a foundation, the freedom thought of by the moderns as ultimate causality and the absence of external impediments to human will presents itself as an aporia which, although it is not the purpose, has ontologically enabled the domination and violence present in the 20th century and today. Phenomenology is the way in which we have tried to meditate on the phenomenon in order to unveil the sense of being of human rights and describe the aporia that exists from the outset in the construction of their foundation in tradition. After indicating the phenomenological method in the first chapter, the question of human rights is posed from the point of view of the aporia identified by thinkers from the philosophical tradition. Next, we investigate how tradition has grounded these rights, especially by pointing out in Hobbesian and Kantian thought what was essentially thought. Heideggerian thought then describes existential analysis and the facticity of the world as the elements that make the history of being possible. Subjectivity as the ontological-historical horizon of modernity and technique in contemporary times are included in the fifth chapter, enabling reflection on what is presupposed in the founding discourse of human rights and highlighting the aporia. Having considered this context, the final chapter serves to think about the path to phenomenological seeing by addressing originary thinking and calculative thinking, humanism and the essence of man and, finally, the essence of freedom. The general objective is to investigate how freedom as the foundation of human rights constitutes an aporia from which to emerge: it is necessary to think about human rights beyond universalism and relativism in order, with the suspension of judgment, to investigate things by themselves in historicity or, in other words, to describe the essence of human rights in historicity; Subjectivity is the historical measure that is presupposed in the freedom that grounds rights and, in this way, disregards the ontological relationship with the other and thinks about rights individually; The rationality that guides free will in tradition is deficient and secondary because it is not originally in the dynamics of the constitution of actions; the definition of man as a rational animal makes it possible to objectify man in the age of technology without any opposition from human rights; and, finally, the original liberation of man is only possible with original thinking and truth as allowing oneself to be what one is.