Nome, objeto e sentido proposicional: realismo e antirrealismo no Tractatus

Abstract

This Masters Thesis deals with the classic debate between realists and antirealists concerning the Tractatus. We attempt to show that, when one reading (realism) or another (anti-realism) is adopted, one does not adopt merely a different position, but a distinct project of interpretation for the book. Since both readings focus on a group of propositions of the book, they end up developing different and, to a large extent, opposed projects. The realistic reading, for example, due to its emphasis on group 2 propositions, assumes Wittgensteins types that determine the logical form of simple names; the anti-realistic reading, on the other hand, by emphasizing group 3 propositions, places Wittgenstein as an uncompromising defender of the contextual use of simple names. Our goal is to defend that the anti-realistic reading is more complete than the realistic one as a philosophical project, since it accounts for, in a consistent way, more propositions without, however, attributing non textual or metaphysical theses to Wittgenstein, as the realists do. This does not mean, however, that the anti-realistic thesis of the contextual use of names explains the details of the relation between language and reality that Wittgenstein proposes.