Estratégias de determinante zero de press-dyson e estratégias boas

Abstract

Cooperation assumes a sort of donation, which may not be reciprocated. Notwithstanding, several mathematical models [[6], [10], [8]] show that cooperation is possible as outcome of an evolutionary biological process. The Prisoner Dilemma (PD) is a paradigm able to represent several situations of cooperation and the repetition of an interaction is a way in which cooperation is possible. For this reason, we will study an extension of the simple PD called Infinitely Repetitive Prisoner Dilemma (IRPD). In this context, the aim of this work is to expose a recently discovered class of memory one strategies to the IRPD, the Press and Dysson's zero determinant strategies. We willanalyze them from Akin's point of view [1]. For the purpose of cooperationphenomenon studies, the concept of good strategies introduced by Akin is quite relevant. We will see that there exist good strategies which are not zero determinant and zero determinant strategies that are not good. Although we will not introduce any type of evolutionary dynamics in this dissertation, after completing its reading the reader is expected to realize that the good strategies make the emergence of cooperation possible.