Redes lógicas e a física na linguagem : da mecânica de Hertz a uma leitura não-metafísica do Tractatus

Abstract

This work aims to present an interpretation of Hertz’s philosophy of science that may contribute to resolving the dispute over whether or not Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP) offered a substantive response to the question on the relation between language and reality. I argue that Hertz’s work helps to clarify in a specific way central aspects of the early Wittgenstein’s notation, pictorial conception of language and view of Science; and this, I claim, may contribute to a non-metaphysical interpretation of the TLP. More specifically, I advocate that Hertz’s philosophy of science sheds light on the following points of the TLP: i) the formal character of the tractarian concepts (i.e., simple objects, forms); ii) the relation between logic, science and language; and iii) the supposed conventionalist stance of the TLP towards mechanics – to which I offer a counter argument. Furthermore, I argue that these points must be elucidated on the basis of what is shown by the features of the very symbolism presented, and not on a purported metaphysical doctrine of meaning. This, I suggest, may support a non-metaphysical interpretation of the Tractatus.