Indução e circularidade : um exame da resposta fiabilista ao problema de Hume

Abstract

The aim of this dissertation is to present and evaluate a reliabilist account to the problem of induction. Roughly, the problem arises because we can‟t avoid reasoning inductively in attempting to justify induction. Given that circularity is considered an epistemic vicious, trying to justify our inductive practices has been taken as a doomed task. Here skepticism comes in picture: if we can‟t justify our inductive practices, we aren‟t justified in hold inductively grounded beliefs. Reliabilists deny that all circularity is vicious. Insofar as induction is reliable, maintain reliabilists, beliefs produced by it will be justified ones, including those beliefs about induction‟s own reliability. Although reliabilism is a considerable progress in the attempts to solve the problem of induction, we will see that it faces a number of problems, making the attempt an unsuccessful one.