Acerca da primitividade do dever-ser

Abstract

In the scope of normative sciences, the assertion that normativity cannot be derived from facticity (thesis of the ought’s primitiveness) is recurrent. In other words, this thesis says that norms could not be obtained exclusively from physical facts. Despite being a fundamental premise of sciences such as the General Theory of Law and Practical Philosophy, no satisfactory justifications have been outlined to legitimize the thesis, which gives rise to a specific reflection on its validity. Given this gap, this work aims to analyze the primitivity thesis, explaining its validity conditions. Initially, a history of the discussion on the topic will be presented, with a specific analysis of the interpretations of David Hume and Hans Kelsen. Next, the concept of normativity will be defined, highlighting the distinction between the effective (concrete) norm and its linguistic manifestations. In the end, it is highlighted that normativity must be understood as a special type of “determination” and that in this characterization lies the legitimizing foundation of the primitivity thesis.