Direito e método: a análise conceitual modesta como etapa inicial da investigação filosófica na teoria do direito

Abstract

This thesis aims to defend, based on the paradigm of Frank Jackson's theory, conceptual analysis as an initial methodological stage of the philosophical investigation of jurisprudence. This defense is based on the notions of concepts and conceptual analysis (modest and immodest) and seeks to verify whether, among the works of HLA Hart, Joseph Raz, Ronald Dworkin, John Finnis and Brian Leiter, there is any plausible demonstration of the use of the aforementioned investigation method philosophical point. Finally, it will be proposed as a hypothesis that jurisprudence must be done in stages - in a similar sense to what Julie Dickson contends in her indirectly evaluative legal philosophy - and that the first of them must be conceptual analysis, which can be followed by empirical or normative analysis. The first chapter is dedicated to the notions of concepts, in particular, their metaphysics, with the adoption of the theory of mental representation. The second chapter deals with conceptual analysis, its historical development, its criticisms and the development of the theory as elaborated by Frank Jackson. The third chapter covers the concept of law and its analysis. At this point, the theories of Hart, Raz, Finnis, Dworkin and Leiter will be examined, from the perspective of Jackson's conceptual analysis. Finally, the fourth chapter, adopting Julie Dickson's idea of staged inquiry, contains the defense itself of modest conceptual analysis as a philosophical investigative method suitable for the first stage of any theory of law that claims to be comprehensive.