Elogiar o cavalo pela sombra do asno : o funcionamento dos nomes a partir do Crátilo de Platão

Abstract

The thesis aims to understand how names work according to Plato's Cratylus. This dialogue discusses the correction of names in the face of two extreme theories. For conventionalism names have no truth value while naturalism does not admit the existence of false names. During the confrontation of these theories Socrates presents a double function for names. They are seen as distinctive and informative tools. In the first part we will give some evidence that the 'distinction' consists in making a reference to the Idea of the named thing. This natural relation between Ideas and names allow the latter to have a truth value. The tricky feature is that names refer through their descriptive capacity which is the informative side of their function. Relying on conventional elements as the etymologies this descriptive capacity can inform only about the name-giver's opinions about the referent, as the second part discusses. In the third part, the ambiguity of this double status of names is analyzed in relation to the discursive search for knowledge. Names seem to be necessary for reference, yet they are unable to give any kind of useful information about the essential characteristics of their referents.