Incomplete understanding of concepts and knowing in part what something is

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1843/51045

Type:	Artigo de Periódico
Title:	Incomplete understanding of concepts and knowing in part what something is
Authors:	André Joffily Abath
Abstract:	Burge (1979) famously argued that one can have thoughts involving a concept C even if one’s understanding of C is incomplete. Even though this view has been extremely influential, it has also been taken by critics as being less than clear. The aim of this paper is to show that the cases imagined by Burge (1979) as being ones in which incomplete understanding of concepts is involved can be made clearer given an account of direct concept ascriptions — such as “Peter has the concept of arthritis” — according to which these ascrip-tions are to be analysed in terms of ascriptions of the knowledge of what something is. The upshot is that the cases imagined by Burge (1979) can be explained is terms of the idea of subjects knowing in part what something is.
Subject:	Burge, Tyler Conceitos
language:	por
metadata.dc.publisher.country:	Brasil
Publisher:	Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
Publisher Initials:	UFMG
metadata.dc.publisher.department:	FAF - DEPARTAMENTO DE FILOSOFIA
Rights:	Acesso Aberto
metadata.dc.identifier.doi:	https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n2p419
URI:	http://hdl.handle.net/1843/51045
Issue Date:	2020
metadata.dc.url.externa:	https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/70665
metadata.dc.relation.ispartof:	Principia: an international journal of epistemology
Appears in Collections:	Artigo de Periódico

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