O que os doadores de campanha ganham? : o financiamento privado e os contratos públicos nos estados brasileiros

Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to determine if donors who support elected politicians at the state level get contractual advantages from their contributions. It is meant to add to the specialist literature on wealth, politics, and democracy by examining the issue that economic resources might destabilize the relationship between the government and organized interests by overrepresenting structured interests. On the other hand, contributing financially to one's preferred political causes constitutes political involvement and is therefore allowed under democratic regimes. Additionally, parties and candidates need resources to engage voters, advertise their political viewpoints, and educate them about their options. To complete this project, statistics from the 2010 and 2014 elections were analyzed, as well as contract information between the governments of eight states and the contracted person. The study uses descriptive statistics and a difference-in-differences identification technique to examine the causal hypothesis that private campaign funding results in more favorable behavior by state governors and lawmakers who receive such donations. My results show that companies that establish links with elected politicians do not receive bigger contracts compared to companies that finance the ones that are defeated. This conclusion puts into question the current situation of business financing as a profitable investment. Therefore, campaign funding could be rewarded by politicians, causing public purchases to be biased. However, due to the insignificance of most of the results, this volume of rewards would be very small compared to the volume of contracts signed with the state. It also discusses the likely consequences of the new financial regulation which excluded corporations from the electoral system on economic power's meddling in the political system in general, and on the arrangement of incentives between politicians and contributors in particular.